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Eldred v. Ashcroft1 offered the Supreme Court broad issues about the
scope of Congress’s constitutional power to legislate in the area of intellectual property. In 1998, Congress added twenty years to the term of all

*
Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Andy BeckermanRodau and Lorie Marie Graham for comments on a draft.
1.
537 U.S. 186 (2003). For analysis of how Eldred may affect the constitutional law
of intellectual property and associated scholarship, see Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional
Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. (forthcoming 2003).
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copyrights, both existing and future copyrights. But for this term extension, works created during the 1920s and 1930s would be entering the
public domain. Now such works will remain under copyright until 2018
and beyond. Eldred v. Ashcroft rejected two challenges to the constitutionality of the copyright extension. The first challenge contended that
Congress had exceeded its power to grant copyrights for “limited Times”
in order to “promote the Progress of Science.”3 The purpose of copyright
protection is to provide an incentive to create works, but nothing
Congress did in 1998 could provide an incentive to create works in the
1920s.4 However, the Court declined to impose the sort of limits it has
recently imposed on other powers of Congress, especially Congress’s
power to regulate commerce. Rather, the Court held that the Constitution
left it to Congress to choose the intellectual property regime that best
serves the purposes of the Copyright Clause.5 Eldred also rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of the term extension. The
plaintiffs had argued that the term extension was a content-neutral regulation that should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.6 The Court, however, reasoned that First Amendment scrutiny was unnecessary where Congress had not “altered the traditional
7
contours of copyright.” The Copyright Clause was adopted around the
same time as the First Amendment, and so copyright was probably not
8
considered inconsistent with the First Amendment. Moreover, copyright
law itself provides traditional First Amendment safeguards, such as fair
use and the freedom to copy ideas from protected works.9
As Eldred made its way from the trial court to the D.C. Circuit to the
Supreme Court, the case drew increasing attention from both lawyers
and the public. Interest in the case went well beyond the interests at
2.
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) & (d), 112 Stat.
2827–28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304) (cited in Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193).
3.
U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4.
The Eldred Court summarized Petitioners’ argument:
Petitioners dominantly advance a series of arguments all premised on the proposition
that Congress may not extend an existing copyright absent new consideration from the
author. . . . Petitioners contend that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights
(1) overlooks the requirement of ‘originality,’ (2) fails to ‘promote the Progress of Science,’ and (3) ignores copyright’s quid pro quo.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210.
5.
See id. at 222 (“As we read the Framers’ instruction, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”).
6.
See id. at 218 (“Petitioners separately argue that the CTEA is a content-neutral
regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amendment.”).
7.
Id. at 221.
8.
See id. at 219.
9.
See id. at 218–22.
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stake, involving whether such works as The Great Gatsby (published
1925), Gone With The Wind (published 1936), or “Happy Birthday to
You” (published 1935) would finally go into the public domain. Rather,
the case came to symbolize the increasing tension in intellectual property
rights.10 Congress and the courts have increased copyright protection in a
number of ways, including the term extension. The parties filing amicus
briefs in the Supreme Court included the Free Software Foundation, authors and publishers (on both sides of the issue), libraries, archives,
consumer groups, and various bodies interested in constitutional law.
The case promised ramifications well beyond the specific issue—the
copyright status of works published before 1923. For example, the Free
Software Foundation was not concerned about being able to use software
published in the 1920s.11 Rather, it sought to ensure that Congress generally would be limited in its ability to shrink the public domain.12
In terms of legal doctrine, Eldred offered an opportunity to address
issues that have becoming increasingly important but have little Supreme
Court case law directly on point: the extent of Congress’s power to
legislate in the area of intellectual property, and the limits that the First
Amendment places on intellectual property protection. Intellectual
property protection has expanded in every area. Patent now covers
subject matter long thought unpatentable, such as business methods13 and
10.
Considerable recent scholarship questions the recent expansions in the scope of
intellectual property protection. See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens:
Law and the Construction of the Information Society (1996); Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2001); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 191 (1994–
1995); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the
Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain
Music, 46 Duke L.J. 241 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 Duke L.J. 455 (1991); Jessica A. Litman, The Public Domain,
39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990); William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or
How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread From Authors, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
661 (1996); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149,
1154 (1998) (discussing the “seemingly inexorable expansion of copyright”); Pamela
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134. For a broad view, see Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715 (2003).
11.
For a discussion of the role of the free software movement, see Joseph Scott Miller,
Allchin’s Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software, 20 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 491 (2002).
12.
On the free software movement as a paradigm shift in the creation of intellectual
works, see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale
L.J. 369 (2002). On how open source licenses use the restrictions of intellectual property law
to keep software code effectively in the public domain, see David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241 (2001); Stephen M. McJohn, The
Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25 (2000).
13.
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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software. Federal trademark law has expanded steadily—both
incrementally in some areas, and wholesale with the addition of antidilution measures and anti-cybersquatting provisions to the Lanham
Act.15 The copyright statute is overflowing with new types of protection.
Just how far intellectual property protection can extend has become a
vital issue.
Because there was so little case law on point, Eldred was an unusually difficult case to predict. Eldred raised important issues with respect
to interpreting two parts of the Constitution: the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause. Eldred was not a part of a line of cases that might
give some basis for the expected analysis. To the contrary, both issues
raised constitutional issues largely left open by Supreme Court case law.
The Court has reams of opinions on the First Amendment, but none directly addressing the full interplay between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause. Likewise, the Court has decided many copyright
cases, but always in the context of applying the copyright statute.
Although the Court has given some attention to the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution in those cases, it has never examined the full bounds of
Congress’s power under the Clause.16 Thus, the Eldred Court was not
facing the application of constitutional principles in a new fact setting.
Rather, it was interpreting constitutional questions that the Court had
never squarely addressed.
The plaintiffs developed several related but subtly distinct theories to
attack the constitutionality of the copyright extension.17 Over the various
stages of the litigation, they honed the strongest arguments, based on a
synthesis of judicial authority, historical arguments, and policy considerations. They crafted the issues to present the strongest available
14.
See Dan Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 136 (2000) (citing AT&T
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
15.
On the development and expansion of trademark law, see Kenneth L. Port, The
Congressional Expansion Of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System In The Making,
35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 827 (2000).
16.
The Court has addressed specific limits on the powers of Congress to protect intellectual property. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding
that originality was constitutionally required for copyright protection); Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that the First Amendment did not
preclude infringement liability for publishing unauthorized excerpts from ex-President’s autobiography); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that trademarks were not works
of authorship that could be protected under the Copyright Clause). But none of those decisions
concerned the outer limits of Congress’s power under the Clause as a whole. Feist, by comparison to Eldred, takes a more direct approach to enforcing the limitations on congressional
power under the Patent and Copyright Clause. See Samuelson, supra note 1 (contrasting
Feist’s emphasis on constitutional limits on copyright to Eldred’s deferential standard).
17.
See Samuelson, supra note 1 (analyzing the “complex, yet powerful” constitutional
arguments crafted by counsel for Eldred, and the Court’s one-dimensional response).
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arguments, while avoiding some pitfalls in the case law. Not least, they
elicited from the federal court of appeal a categorical statement that cried
out for Supreme Court review: the proclamation that copyright is categorically immune from First Amendment review.18 All the arguments
could be broadly characterized as variants on a basic theme. Copyright is
limited by both the scope of the Copyright Clause and by the First
Amendment. Copyright legislation, because it gives individuals exclusive rights and thus the ability to restrict expression, must have some
countervailing public benefit. Adding twenty years to copyright for
works created decades ago has no public benefit, rather it is a windfall to
the copyright holders. Thus, the copyright extension lacks a constitutional basis.
The plaintiffs also laid a strong factual basis for the challenge. A
single plaintiff would have been sufficient to bring a test case challenging the constitutionality of the copyright extension. Instead, to make the
adverse consequences of the extension concrete, a coalition of plaintiffs
and amici came together, including publishers of classic books (both
online and press), an Internet archive, music publishers, libraries, artists
of many stripes, film preservationists, and more.
This Article explores the consequences of Eldred for intellectual
property law and for constitutional law. The first two parts seek to place
Eldred within the larger First Amendment and federalism case law.19 As
Part I discusses, with respect to First Amendment law generally, Eldred
could well be read as the first First Amendment case to use
“traditionalism” to define the scope of protected rights. Such a reading
would represent a considerable change in First Amendment law. Part II
discusses how to reconcile Eldred with the line of recent federalism
cases, which it seemed to ignore. The rest of the Article looks to the
effects of Eldred. As Part III discusses, with respect to copyright, Eldred
leaves open the possibility of First Amendment scrutiny of nontraditional
18.
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375–76 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United Video v.
FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176–78 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
19.
As initial commentary indicated, the Eldred opinion itself offered surprisingly little
discussion of how it fit into either the First Amendment or the Article I federalism case law. See
Jack Balkin, Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Unconstitutional under Eldred v. Ashcroft?
(January 18, 2003), at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_balkin_archive.html#87596430
(discussing whether, with respect to the First Amendment, Eldred’s deference toward traditional
copyright protection would not extend to recent innovations in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act); Orin Kerr, Eldred And Limited Powers (Jan. 17, 2003), at http://volokh.blogspot.com/
2003_01_12_volokh_archive.html (suggesting that although Eldred may seem inconsistent with
the Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases, Eldred did not involve the same conflict between
state and federal powers); Eugene Kontorovich, Constitutional Law And Tradition (Jan. 18,
2003), at http://volokh.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_volokh_archive.html (suggesting that
Eldred’s First Amendment result represented a reliance on tradition, which could lead to
similar reliance in other First Amendment areas).
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copyright protection. Congress has added various nontraditional
protections to the copyright statute, such as protection for anticircumvention technologies, for copyright management information, and
other types of proposed protection against consumer copying. Such
provisions may still be susceptible to challenge after Eldred. Part IV
analyzes whether, within copyright law, Eldred could affect the everchanging role of the fair use doctrine. Fair use has been threatened by
various judicial decisions, legislation, and academic theories. Eldred,
however, firmly grants fair use constitutional status, by making it a basis
for the constitutionality of copyright law in general. Fair use may now
also play a greater role in protecting expressive interests with respect to
use of copyrighted works. Finally, Part V analyzes whether Eldred could
also affect the interplay between federal and state intellectual property
law. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the primary role in
regulating intellectual property, but courts have been relatively reluctant
to read the federal copyright statute as preempting state law. Eldred gives
strength to arguments that federal policies central to copyright, such as
fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy, should not be frustrated by
conflicting state law in such areas as software licensing and database
protection.

I. ELDRED’S First Amendment Analysis as Traditionalism
A. Framing the First Amendment Issue in Eldred
The free speech issue in Eldred was whether extending the term of
existing copyrights by twenty years violated the First Amendment.20
Copyright, by its nature, restricts expression. A copyright holder generally has the exclusive rights to make copies of the work, distribute copies
to the public, adapt the work, perform the work publicly and display the
work publicly.21 Such restrictions raise the issue of freedom of speech for
others who wish to use the work in their own expressive capacity.
The Eldred plaintiffs did not take the position that copyright is a
content-based restriction on speech, which would require strict scrutiny.
Copyright depends on the content of the relevant work, but does not differentiate between works based on viewpoint.22 The plaintiffs contended
that copyright is a content-neutral restriction on speech, subject to the
sort of intermediate scrutiny applied in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.

20.
21.
22.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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23

v. FCC. Thus, the restriction would be constitutional only “if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of
free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”24
The justifications for extending the term of existing copyrights might
best be characterized as plausible. The primary purpose of copyright protection is to provide an incentive to create works.25 That purpose is
hardly served by extending the copyrights of existing works. However,
such retrospective extension has been defended on several grounds. By
consistently making all extensions retroactive, Congress could assure
authors of the benefit of extensions that occurred after creation.26 This
assurance would add to the initial incentive to create the work.27 The extension also was thought to harmonize U.S. law with the longer
copyright terms in some jurisdictions, thus assuring U.S. authors of
equal treatment abroad, permitting the U.S. to play a strong role in shaping international intellectual property regimes, and creating more
incentives for foreign works to be distributed in the U.S.28 Another rationale was that longer copyright terms would encourage copyright
holders to invest in the “restoration and public distribution of their
works.”29 Thus, there were colorable arguments served by the term extension.
Nevertheless, as many commentators have shown in the past few
years, the strength of those arguments is dubious.30 If the Court applied
23.
512 U.S. 622 (1994), aff ’d, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). Plaintiffs relied on Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
See also Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1
(1987); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002);
Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Robert Denicola, Copyright and
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283
(1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970);
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright,
and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information
as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665 (1992).
24.
U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
25.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
26.
See id. at 204.
27.
See id. at 205.
28.
See id. at 206 n.13 (citing Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate
Isolationism?, 26 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 17, 59 (2002)).
29.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207.
30.
See Commentary on Copyright Term Extension, at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary.html (collecting commentary
criticizing the policy and constitutionality of the copyright term extension).
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rigorous First Amendment scrutiny, they would probably not be sufficient to uphold the statute. The copyright extension would have difficulty
meeting both parts of that test. Whether the extension advanced important governmental interests was questionable. In addition, the copyright
extension by definition burdened speech. Since the extension applied
across the board to all copyrights, it would very likely burden more
speech than necessary.31 So application of intermediate scrutiny would
make it difficult for the copyright extension to pass muster. The key to
the First Amendment case, then, was whether or not the Court chose to
apply intermediate scrutiny.32
The Eldred Court refused to do so.33 Rather, the Court held that
copyright protection is generally not subject to First Amendment
34
scrutiny. The Court based this conclusion on several grounds. First, the
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close together in
time. This indicated that the Framers regarded copyright as consistent
with the First Amendment.35 Second, the Court considered that copyright
and the First Amendment were also consistent in effect. Copyright is a
restriction on speech, but its purpose is the same as the First
Amendment—to promote speech.36 By giving authors exclusive rights,
copyright provides a strong incentive for the creation and dissemination
of works.37 Copyright law also has “built-in First Amendment
38
accommodations.” Copyright protects only creative expression; it is not
copyright infringement to copy ideas from a copyrighted work.39 Thus,
31.
The expansion of copyright beyond its incentive rationale has been widely noted. A
key piece in the literature was written by a law professor who later became one of the Justices
to decide Eldred, which added a nice twist to guessing the possible outcome. See Stephen
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970) (early piece recognizing that copyright
protection was broader than necessary, even before the considerable broadening under the
1976 Act).
32.
See Netanel, supra note 23; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for
Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. (2000) (discussing
how copyright is difficult to square with First Amendment doctrine).
33.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
34.
See id.
35.
See id. at 219.
36.
See id.
37.
See id. (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” (quoting Harper & Row Publishers Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). A recent article opens up an area that has received too little attention: the incentives of users to further disseminate works. See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the FileSwapping Networks, 89 Va. L. Rev. 505 (2003).
38.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
39.
See id. at 217–21.
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copyright does not restrict communication of ideas. In addition,
copyright also authorizes fair use of copyrighted works. Thus, others
may copy works for such purposes as education, criticism, news
reporting, or research.40 Relying on these “traditional First Amendment
safeguards” contained within copyright law, the Court held that First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary where “Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection.”41
A striking aspect of the First Amendment discussion in Eldred is the
limited discussion of precedent. The Court made no effort to sift through
its voluminous First Amendment case law, determine which of the many
tests apply, and apply that test to the case at bar. Rather, the Court relied
on two facts: (1) copyright has been around as long as the First Amendment, and (2) copyright contains limitations that serve to protect the
freedom to distribute ideas.42 The Court indicated that because Congress
had been restricting speech through copyright since the founding of the
43
nation, such restrictions were implicitly authorized. Such an approach
to constitutional interpretation can be understood as “traditionalism.”44
B. The Traditionalist Mode of Constitutional Interpretation
Constitutional interpretation has several well-known approaches,
which can be characterized as looking primarily to text, structure, history, ethos, and doctrine, each with variants.45 Textualism seeks to be
46
guided by the very words of the Constitution. Intentionalists seek to
40.
See id. at 219–20.
41.
Id. at 221.
42.
See id. at 219.
43.
See id.
44.
For an early commentator suggesting that Eldred be best explained as traditionalism, see Eugene Kontorovich, Constitutional Law and Tradition (Jan. 18, 2003), at
http://volokh.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_volokh_archive.html (“Basically the Court’s opinion
says this is constitutional because no one, especially the Framers’ generation, ever thought it
was unconstitutional.”) and Philippe de Croy, Constitutional Law and Tradition (Jan. 18,
2003), at http://volokh.blogspot.com/2003_01_12_volokh_archive.html (citing to Justice
Scalia’s classic statement of traditionalism in Rutan and expressing skepticism that Eldred
would have much effect on First Amendment law in other areas). On traditionalism as a principle of constitutional interpretation generally, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change,
and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 303; Anthony T.
Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029 (1990). Justice Scalia’s use of traditionalism can be seen as part of a consistent judicial philosophy. See Eric J. Segall, Justice
Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 911 (1994). Other
commentators have criticized Justice Scalia’s use of tradition. See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial Jurisdiction: The
Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 981 (1992); David A. Strauss,
Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1699 (1991).
45.
1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 31 (3d ed. 2000).
46.
Id. at 32.
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47

determine what the Founders intended. Structuralists seek to implement
an overarching constitutional architecture.48 Originalists seek the meaning of the Constitution as originally adopted and understood.49
“Traditionalism,” a variant of originalism, is a term for a specific
50
type of reliance on tradition. Appeals to tradition are very common in
51
constitutional law. In some areas, such as personal jurisdiction, tradition plays an important part, although its precise role is unsettled and
may be challenged by application to new contexts.52 “Traditionalism”
refers to a specific means of employing tradition in constitutional interpretation. In deciding whether an activity is constitutionally protected, a
traditionalist approach looks to whether such activity was generally considered protected from government regulation.53 Such a use of “negative
precedent” has been followed in several areas of law, most notably in
substantive due process cases.54 Thus, traditionalist interpretation relies
on long-standing practices to define the scope of protected rights, rather
than abstract reasoning about what the scope of rights should be.
Like any mode of constitutional interpretation, traditionalism has
advantages and pitfalls. Tradition can be a salutary safeguard on judicial
competence, preventing judges from concocting new theories with unexpected effects.55 Traditionalism can also be used to safeguard social
cohesion and institutional legitimacy from being undermined by new
56
judicially-created rights. However, traditionalism can also mean sanc-

47.
Id. at 47.
48.
Id. at 40.
49.
Id. at 48.
50.
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (1997).
51.
See David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1035 (1991) (discussing
traditionalism in law generally and distinguishing between traditionalism and reliance on
precedent).
52.
See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 989 (2002).
53.
The use can cut both ways, to permit regulation. See Deborah A. Widiss, Reviewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108
Yale L.J. 237 (1998).
54.
See L. Benjamin Young, Jr., Justice Scalia’s History and Tradition: The Chief
Nightmare in Professor Tribe’s Anxiety Closet, 78 Va. L. Rev. 581 (1992).
55.
See Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power
Theory of the First Amendment, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 251 (2000).
56.
Aaron J. Rappaport, Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and the
Premises of Privacy, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 441, 496; see also J. Richard Broughton, The
Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. Va. L. Rev.
19, 22–23 (2000) (“Thus, Scalia’s traditionalism both gives life to the Constitution and
provides the discipline necessary among those charged with determining its meaning.”);
Timothy L. Raschke Shattuck, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific
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tioning historical types of state regulation, without respect to whether
they in fact are compatible with our understanding of liberty.57 It can
serve to entrench power and unfair majoritarianism.58 Moreover, traditionalism can facilitate result-oriented analysis, through “pick and
choose” interpretivism. A judge may choose to invoke tradition where
the outcome suits her, and rely on other forms of interpretation when it
59
does not. The mechanics of applying tradition are also problematic, as
with any reliance on precedent. First, there are great historical problems
in accurately identifying a tradition. Indeed, many Supreme Court cases
feature Justices advocating inconsistent views of historical traditions.60
For courts to truly identify tradition would require historical research
well beyond the resources of appellate courts.61 Even if the historical
facts are not disputed, what constitutes a tradition and how broadly to
define that tradition are unclear.62 Depending on the level of generality
used, the tradition in question could be narrowly or broadly understood.63
Although traditionalism has become part of the established analysis
in some areas of constitutional law, traditionalism has not been part of
First Amendment analysis. Justice Scalia has several times
unsuccessfully argued for reliance on tradition to define free speech
rights. His classic statement of traditionalism came in Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois.64 The issue in Rutan was whether it violated
Traditions, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2743, 2789 (1992) (arguing that “well-established traditions
and consensus should be determinative of due process in most cases”).
57.
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial
Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 781 (2001).
58.
See Strauss, supra note 44, at 1708.
59.
David Schultz, Scalia on Democratic Decision Making and Long Standing Traditions: How Rights Always Lose, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 319 (1997). Schultz discusses
tensions on the Court over interpretive approaches, relying on James F. Simon, The Center
Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court (1995) and Christopher E.
Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Supreme Court’s Conservative Moment
(1993).
60.
See, e.g., Ron Shinn, Note, Adler v. Duval County School Board, 54 Okla. L. Rev.
775 (2001) (discussing reliance on tradition in both majority and dissenting opinions).
61.
See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 409 (1999).
62.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis
Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 Gonz. L. Rev. 433 (2000–2001); see also Matthew D.
Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis and the Future of Substantive Due Process
in the Executive Setting, 41 Santa Clara L. Rev. 437 (2001) (discussing competing approaches to defining relevant tradition).
63.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 82 (1992) (“Justice Scalia’s R.A.V. opinion
approached First Amendment tradition at a much higher level of generality than his Michael
H. opinion approached privacy.”).
64.
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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the First Amendment for patronage practices in government employment
(such as promotions and transfers) to be based on political affiliation.65
Applying strict scrutiny First Amendment analysis, the majority held that
such practices were unconstitutional because they were not narrowly
tailored to serve vital government interests.66 Justice Scalia dissented,
arguing that the application of strict scrutiny to such practices was a
67
misinterpretation of the First Amendment. Rather, such patronage
practices dated back to before the time of the First Amendment.68
Accordingly, the First Amendment should be interpreted in light of the
contemporaneous tradition, rather than the Court’s own abstract
reasoning.
The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to restrain
transient majorities from impairing long-recognized personal
liberties. They did not create by implication novel individual
rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights
bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread,
and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down. Such a
venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract
principle of First Amendment adjudication devised by this
Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff
out of which the Court’s principles are to be formed. They are,
in these uncertain areas, the very points of reference by which
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to be figured
out. When it appears that the latest “rule,” or “three-part test,” or
“balancing test” devised by the Court has placed us on a collision course with such a landmark practice, it is the former that
must be recalculated by us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens.69
65.
See id. at 70.
66.
See id. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67.
See id. at 70 n.4.
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at 95–96 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted); see Daniel A. Farber, The
First Amendment 204–05 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting the language from Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Rutan and discussing how adoption of such an approach would considerably alter the landscape of First Amendment jurisprudence). Justice Scalia has also urged traditionalism in
dissents in other areas. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Justice
Scalia dissenting from Court’s holding that Virginia violated the Equal Protection Clause by
maintaining separate men’s and women’s military colleges: “It counts for nothing the long
tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military colleges supported by both States
and the Federal Government”). United States v. Virginia makes an interesting comparison to
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Despite the urging of Justice Scalia in Rutan and several subsequent
dissents (often quoting the very language above), the Court as a whole
has never adopted traditionalism as part of its First Amendment analysis.70 Indeed, reliance on traditionalism would “have broad implications
for First Amendment doctrine.”71 The fact that a practice is a longstanding tradition does not generally shield it from First Amendment
scrutiny. To the contrary, the course of First Amendment jurisprudence
has been one of giving protection to speech that had been traditionally
regulated.72 Before the twentieth century, the First Amendment had seldom been used to prevent state regulation of speech. The Court,
however, steadily increased the categories of speech that were protected
as well as the level of scrutiny that would apply to state regulation. The
Court did not shy at protecting a category of speech simply because it
had not been protected before. However, some traditionalism is implicit
in First Amendment case law. For example, courts have accorded states
great discretion in regulating speech in institutions such as schools and
prisons. There “can be little doubt that the strong tradition of restricting
speech within these institutions had much to do with the decisions.”73
C. Eldred’s Application of Traditionalist Analysis
Eldred took an approach along traditionalist lines. The Court placed
great weight on tradition, and declined to engage in abstract reasoning
about what limits the First Amendment placed on copyright protection.
To the contrary, the Court looked to “traditional First Amendment safeguards” within copyright itself.74 The idea/expression dichotomy ensured
that although an author’s expression may be protected by copyright,
ideas may always be freely copied. Fair use ensures that even expression
may be copied, where the balance of relevant factors tips in favor of fair
use. Beyond those traditional practices, the Court found it unnecessary to
determine whether First Amendment interests were properly balanced. In
short, the Court relied exclusively on tradition in respecting Congress’s
power to define copyright protection. Eldred thus treated copyright the
way that Justice Scalia would have treated patronage practices in Rutan.
Because copyright has been around since the time of the First Amendment and has been generally unchallenged, the First Amendment would
not be interpreted to put limits on it.
the Eldred case, because the majority opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg, took a much less
deferential approach to tradition than her opinion in Eldred. See de Croy, supra note 44.
70.
See Farber, supra note 69.
71.
Id. at 204.
72.
See id. at 204–05.
73.
Id.
74.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
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Eldred next used a different type of tradition in defining the scope of
copyright’s insulation. The Court rejected the dubious statement by the
court below that copyright was categorically immune from First
Amendment scrutiny.75 Few categories of speech are categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny. Such immunity obtains in limited
areas where the speech is deemed to lack any social value, such as
threats.76 To completely insulate copyright from First Amendment scrutiny would permit Congress to pass any type of restriction on speech it
wished simply by making it part of Chapter 17 of the United States
Code, the Copyright Act. For example, in Reno v. ACLU,77 the Court
struck down certain regulation of the Internet as contrary to the First
Amendment. Congress could simply reenact the same regulation characterized as copyright law. To avoid such broad immunity, the Eldred
Court restricted its ruling, relying once again on tradition. First Amendment scrutiny would not apply where Congress had “not altered the
traditional contours of copyright.”78
Eldred did not explicitly invoke the Rutan line of cases, or classify
itself as relying on traditionalism, but the opinion lends itself to interpretation as relying on traditionalism. One could simply construe it as
relying on text and structure, interpreting the Constitution as a whole.
The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were roughly contemporaneous, so the First Amendment should not be read as limiting the
powers granted under the Copyright Clause. Such a reading, however,
runs afoul of at least two objections. First, the Court relied primarily on
matter arising after the adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights,
such as the fair use doctrine, the idea/expression dichotomy, and congressional and judicial formation of the contours of copyright law.79
Second, the Eldred Court expressly disavowed the lower court’s ruling
that copyright legislation is categorically immune from First Amendment
scrutiny.80 In defining the interplay between copyright and the First
Amendment, it looked not to lines set by the text or structure of the Con81
stitution, but rather to the traditional contours of copyright law.
An intentionalist interpretation of Eldred is unsatisfactory, for similar reasons. The Court did not bolster its approach with an analysis of the
Framers’ intention with respect to the interplay between the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment. The Court recognized that the purpose
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 221.
See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
See id. at 217–22.
See id. at 221.
See id.
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of copyright was to promote the creation and dissemination of expression.82 The First Amendment and the Copyright Clause were adopted
around the same time, indicating a general understanding on the part of
the Framers that copyright was consistent with freedom of speech. Beyond that general recognition, the Court did not look to the intent of the
Framers in implementing copyright. Notably, the Court has freely exercised First Amendment scrutiny when Congress has used its other
powers in ways that unduly restrict the freedom of speech. Eldred did
not offer any reason why that would have been the intention of the
Framers.
Eldred’s summary treatment of First Amendment law also accords
with a traditionalist reading. Eldred made little attempt to fit the case
within the abstract approach typical of First Amendment law (and contrary to a traditionalist approach). Eldred makes little discussion of First
Amendment law generally and how the case fits within it. Rather, it
treats copyright as sui generis. Eldred also made short work of the plaintiff’s attempt to fit the case within the overall structure of First
Amendment doctrine. In rejecting the argument that the long line of intermediate scrutiny cases applied, the Court distinguished them simply
by saying that “the First Amendment securely protects the freedom to
make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”83 The
Court thus indicated that originality is a key factor in First Amendment
protection, but the originality of speech has never been part of the various tests for evaluating laws that restrict speech. Many of the Supreme
Court’s own cases struck down restrictions on speech or expressive activity that consisted of distributing the speech of others. Indeed, First
Amendment protections have applied even where the speech was obtained through illegal means, such as a recording of a phone
conversation about union negotiations84 and the New York Times publish85
ing secret Defense Department documents about the Vietnam War. So
originality is hardly a requirement for First Amendment protection.
Moreover, the Court’s language about “other people’s speeches” does
not note that many copyrights are owned not by the original creator, but
by employers or transferees. So “other people’s speeches” must mean
that speech can be owned, for First Amendment purposes—another
82.
See id. at 219.
83.
Id. at 221.
84.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
85.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart,
and Bartnicki, Hous. L. Rev., (forthcoming IP Symposium Issue 2003) (giving several reasons why nonoriginal speech may be constitutionally valuable).
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novel doctrine that would bear analysis under the case law. Finally, copyright infringement often involves more than simply copying others’
speech. Rather, it can be using the work of another as a basis to create a
new creative work. So the Court’s reference to “the speech of others”
cannot be the full basis for creating a First Amendment enclave for copyright.
In short, Eldred may be best read as applying a traditionalist approach. The Court did not explicitly invoke traditionalism, but it did not
explicitly invoke any interpretive approach or even any major First
Amendment doctrine. Eldred relied on tradition to define whether the
speech was protected (by holding that copyright is generally immune
from First Amendment protection), to supply safeguards based on tradition rather than abstract tests (the traditional built-in safeguards of fair
use and the idea/expression dichotomy) and to define the scope of protection (by limiting its ruling to the “traditional contours of copyright
protection”). Such a traditionalist approach may well be the only way to
generally uphold copyright legislation in the long run. If copyright were
subject to First Amendment scrutiny, then upholding copyright would
require finding some countervailing advantage to the speech restrictions
inherent in copyright. The steady broadening of copyright protection
would make it quite difficult to do so in a number of areas.86 Moreover,
opening copyright up to First Amendment scrutiny could require an endless series of cases.
The question that then arises is what role Eldred will play in future
87
First Amendment case law. As noted above, reliance on tradition to define the scope of protected rights represents a new turn in First
Amendment case law. Here, the many vices of traditionalism raise their
head. Tradition is easy to invoke, but difficult to define and prove. Justices are likely to have different views of both the relevant traditions and
the role of tradition in a particular case (just as Justice Stevens’ dissent
in Eldred disputes the majority’s conclusion that there was a longstanding congressional practice of making copyright extensions retroactive). So Eldred is unlikely to change the Court’s overall approach to
First Amendment issues in a determinative way.88 Where Eldred could
play a role is in the application of the First Amendment in the area of
86.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 23 (suggesting that a “good deal” of copyright, such as
the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, is inconsistent with the First Amendment).
87.
A related issue is the extent of freedom of expression in jurisdictions worldwide.
See Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement
in Cyberspace, 79 Or. L. Rev. 575 (2000).
88.
See de Croy, supra note 44 (expressing skepticism that Justices will “adhere to the
same principles of interpretation across widely divergent sorts of constitutional cases, even
when those principles produce outcomes they dislike”).
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intellectual property protection. As discussed below in Part III, Eldred
insulated traditional copyright from First Amendment scrutiny, but implicitly left open to scrutiny non-traditional forms of intellectual
property.

II. ELDRED’S Enumerated Powers Analysis:
Traditionalism and Federalism
A. Eldred as a Departure from Federalism Precedent
The second constitutional issue in Eldred was whether the copyright
extension exceeded the powers of Congress under the Copyright
Clause.89 This argument drew strength from the recent trend of the Court
to read real limits into Congress’s enumerated powers under Article I of
90
the Constitution, sometimes called the “new federalism.” For decades
the Court had accorded great deference to Congress with respect to defining the scope of congressional powers. In particular, the Court had
held that Congress’s power to regulate commerce extended very far. Indeed, so great was the Court’s deference that many wondered whether
there was any practical limit to the extent of the commerce power. The
tide turned in United States v. Lopez,91 where the Court held that the
power to regulate commerce did not authorize a federal statute prohibiting possession of guns in schools. Subsequently, United States v.
Morrison held that the power to regulate commerce did not authorize
portions of the Violence Against Women Act, which regulated genderbased crimes.92 In these cases, the Court made clear that Congress’s
power would be broadly construed, but was subject to outer limits.93 In
particular, the Court scrutinized congressional action closely because the
greater the power of the federal government under the Commerce
Clause, the less room left for states to regulate.

89.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
90.
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L.J. 1707 (2002).
91.
514 U.S. 549 (1995); see Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089 (2000); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 719 (1996); Stephen M.
McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 Duq.
L. Rev. 1 (1995). On federalism as a structural approach to constitutional interpretation generally, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1484 (1987).
92.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
93.
Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 321 (1999) (criticizing Lopez as
setting an unworkable standard).
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The Eldred plaintiffs sought to ride that wave of change in the
Court’s approach to scrutiny of Congress’s enumerated powers. They
argued that the copyright extension similarly exceeded the outer limits of
the Copyright Clause.94 Congress could not use the commerce power to
regulate anything even indirectly linked to commerce. Likewise, Congress’s power to grant copyright for limited times to promote creativity
could not be stretched to granting copyrights with no real time limit on
works that had been created decades ago.95 Indeed, the textual argument
for limits on the copyright power seemed even stronger than that for the
commerce power, because the Copyright Clause itself contained a preamble with limiting language.96
Eldred, however, declined the opportunity to define the outer limits
of the Copyright Clause. The Court did not read the Copyright Clause
itself to impose limits on the intellectual property regime chosen by
Congress. Thus, copyright legislation would not be subject to review of
whether it indeed served the avowed purpose of the Clause, to further the
“Progress of Science.” Rather, Eldred largely left it to Congress to
choose how to regulate in the area of intellectual property: “As we read
the Framers’ instruction, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to
determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s
judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”97
One can read Eldred as inconsistent with the Commerce Clause
98
cases. In the Commerce Clause area, the Court imposed real limits on
the extent of an enumerated congressional power. In Eldred, the Court
did not define any such limit. Moreover, the Justices in the majorities in
Lopez and Morrison (putting limits on the Commerce Clause) joined the
majority in Eldred (declining to put limits on the Copyright Clause). To
put limits on one Article I power but not another seems quite inconsis-

94.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193. For a philosophical approach toward construing the
Copyright Clause, see Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 515 (1997).
95.
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119
(proposing a framework for analyzing Congress’s power under the Intellectual Property
Clause, and arguing that copyright extension clearly exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority).
96.
See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right to their
. . . Writings.”). Some have noted that the phrase “to promote the Progress of Science” could
literally be read as the grant of power in the Clause, but the Clause is more often read as a
power to grant exclusive rights.
97.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
98.
See Kerr, supra note 19; de Croy, supra note 44 (discussing the apparent discrepancy between Lopez and Eldred).
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tent. More than one commentator regarded the “strict constructionists”
on the Court as abandoning the “principles of limited government.”99
B. Distinguishing the Eldred Approach to Federalism
There are several ways one might seek to distinguish the Commerce
Clause cases from Eldred. One could characterize the cases as involving
different types of boundaries. The Commerce Clause cases were core
federalism cases, dealing with the balance of federal and state powers.100
The Court was deciding which matters could be regulated by Congress
and which matters were left to the states.101 By striking down federal
laws regulating possession of guns in school zones and regulating gender-based crimes, the Court left those areas open to exclusive state
regulation. Broadly stated, the cases permit federal legislation in com102
mercial areas and state legislation in social areas. Indeed, the limits to
the Commerce Clause were defined in part by looking to areas of “traditional” state authority.103 Eldred, by contrast, was not specifically about a
balance between federal and state powers. Striking down the copyright
term extension would not have left it to states to pass such extensions.
Rather, the relevant boundary was between federal regulation and no
104
regulation at all. In this reading, “Lopez and Morrison are less about
limited government than they are about limited federal government.”105
So if federalism is about the balance between state and federal interests,
then Eldred might not implicate federalism as directly as did the Commerce Clause cases.
Although Eldred was not about a specific conflict between federal
power and state power, it does affect the balance of those powers. Congress’s power to regulate intellectual property carries with it the power to
preempt state regulation of the same subject matter. The federal copyright and patent laws both preempt state law.106 Accordingly, the greater
power Congress has to regulate intellectual property, the less power

99.
Glenn Reynolds, Copyrights and Creativity (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://
web.archive.org/web/20030207033652/http://www.msnbc.com.news/856672.asp.
100.
See Kerr, supra note 19.
101.
See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1999).
102.
Id.
103.
See James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia’s “Split Personality,”
16 J.L. & Pol. 231 (2000).
104.
Kerr, supra note 19.
105.
Id.
106.
For a discussion of the preemption effects of Eldred, see infra Part V.
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states have. The shift in balance is not hypothetical. For example, Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service108 held that Congress could not
grant copyright to works that lacked originality, such as compilations of
data with no creative components. Accordingly, database proprietors
have since relied on state law, such as contract, trade secret or misappropriation. A shift in congressional power thus does affect the balance of
federal and state powers.
One could also distinguish the Commerce Clause cases as involving
far greater extensions of federal power. The Constitution grants Congress
simply the power to regulate commerce between the states. Congressional legislation under this power had gone far beyond a literal reading
of the words. The recent Commerce Clause cases can be read as permitting Congress to legislate far beyond the literal language of the Clause,
but to recognize that at some point the words must have some meaning.
If the activity is “truly local,” and infringes an area of “traditional state
interests,” then some outer limit must be recognized or the concept of
enumerated powers loses its meaning.109
Eldred, one could argue, did not approach such outer limits. The
Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to grant copyrights, and the copyright extension was about copyrights. The argument in Eldred was that
Congress was going beyond the literal language of the Copyright Clause.
The Court, however, still allows Congress to go well beyond the literal
language of the Commerce Clause. Only when Congress went to the
outer limits of the broadest possible reading of the Commerce Clause did
the Court step in. By analogy, there might be issues if Congress started
using the Copyright Clause as a basis for unrelated legislation. In Eldred,
Congress was not using the Copyright Clause to regulate unrelated subject matter, such as guns in schools or gender-related violence. The
copyright extension was still about copyrights, whereas the regulations
in the Commerce Clause cases had little to do with commerce.
The counterargument is that Congress was approaching such outer
limits with the copyright extension. If the Copyright Clause serves as an
incentive to produce works, then extending copyright on works created
in the 1920s (and adding twenty years to today’s works, thus extending
the term from 2073 to 2093) is just as tenuous as the connection between
guns in schools and interstate commerce. Moreover, the language of the
107.
See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1645, 1653 (1996) (“Copyrights, patents, and
trademarks are all subjects of federal statutes, and all present federalism problems in the
commercial law context. In each case, the question is whether, and to what extent, federal law
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause.”).
108.
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
109.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
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Copyright Clause itself is much more limited than the Commerce
Clause. The Copyright Clause has a limiting preamble (“To promote the
Progress of Science . . .”) and grants Congress only the very specific
power to grant copyrights and patents. The Commerce Clause grants
Congress a general power to regulate (as opposed to granting specific
exclusive rights) over a huge subject matter (interstate commerce). So if
the huge, undefined area has definite limits, surely the narrow, specialized area has limits. However, Eldred did not merely hold that the
copyright extension did not surpass the relevant limits; rather, the Court
did not define any limits at all. So the text of the clauses fails to distinguish the two lines of cases.
Perhaps the most convincing distinction between the Commerce
Clause cases and Eldred lies with a traditionalist interpretation. The
Court upheld regulation in Eldred that was consistent with tradition, and
struck down the regulations in the Commerce Clause cases that were not
consistent with tradition. The Court had quite different views of congressional practices under the Commerce Clause and Copyright Clause.
During the early times of the nation, Congress legislated much more narrowly under the Commerce Clause.110 Once Congress did start to expand
its approach, the early Supreme Court resisted. Many of the early cases
construed the commerce power quite narrowly.111 Early Supreme Court
cases held that the power to regulate interstate commerce did not extend
112
to regulation of manufacturing of goods for commerce, mining of coal
113
to be shipped in interstate commerce, wages of workers dealing with
114
115
products shipped in commerce, pensions of railroad workers, or ma116
jor league baseball. The Court subsequently rejected such limitations
on the commerce power, and regularly upheld federal legislation in such
117
areas, where there was an effect on interstate commerce. Congress then
proceeded to rely on the commerce power to legislate in areas only indirectly related to commerce. The Court acquiesced in those cases as
well.118 So at the time of Lopez, there was no relevant tradition dating
back to the time of the Constitution. Rather, the Commerce Clause had
been used narrowly by Congress, then more broadly, then narrowed by

110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
113.
See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
114.
See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
115.
See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935).
116.
See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
117.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (discussing cases shifting approach to interpretation of Commerce Clause powers).
118.
See id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991354

MCJOHNTYPE.DOC

116

1/27/2004 11:36 AM

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 10:95

Court decisions, then greatly broadened by Congress and Court decisions.
In finally imposing outer limits on the commerce power, the Court
looked explicitly to tradition. Lopez indicated that the federal commerce
power did not extend to regulation of noneconomic activity that was of
“traditional concern” to states.119 Such areas would include family law,
education, and criminal law, where they governed noncommercial aspects of life. By contrast, federal power to regulate purely commercial
activity remained strong after Lopez, even where the link to interstate
commerce was indirect. In short, Lopez represented a view of federalism
that allocated commercial regulation to Congress and social regulation to
the States.120 Thus, Lopez is consistent with traditionalism both in overruling federal regulation (which had not been sanctioned by tradition)
and in defining the scope of the relevant federal power (by reference to
tradition).
Eldred’s reading of the copyright extension would also fit comfortably within a traditionalist interpretation. Indeed, the primary reason that
the Court upheld the copyright extension is that it saw it as continuing a
long-standing tradition in copyright legislation.121 The Court gave great
weight to an “unbroken congressional practice” of making each extension of copyright apply to existing copyrights.122 In so doing, the Court
obliquely took the traditionalist view of valuing experience over abstract
reasoning, pronouncing the traditionalist mantra that “a page of history
is worth a volume of logic.”123
Additional support for a traditionalist reading of Eldred comes in the
Court’s characterization of the issues, which held the very novelty of
plaintiff’s arguments against them. It framed the constitutional arguments against the statute as “several novel readings” of the Copyright
Clause, before rejecting them seriatim.124 The majority opinion further
disparaged the plain novelty of Justice Breyer’s suggested constitutional
125
analysis. The Court’s final paragraph chose reliance on long-standing
practice over “inventive constitutional interpretation.”126 In short, as with
the First Amendment argument, a primary reason for rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments was that such arguments had not been raised before.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id.
See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 101.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003).
See id.
Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
See id. at 222.
See id. at 205 n.10.
Id. at 222.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991354

MCJOHNTYPE.DOC

Fall 2003]

1/27/2004 11:36 AM

Eldred’s Aftermath

117

If Eldred has a place within federalism doctrine, it would be as a
counterweight. The Commerce Clause cases raised many issues as to
whether the Court will restrict congressional power in other areas.
Where such federal powers (like Eldred and unlike the commerce power
cases) have not been restricted by earlier Supreme Court cases, Eldred
would counsel restraint by the Court. As to the more specific area of
federalism and intellectual property, Eldred would have effects in at least
two areas. First, there have been a number of proposals to implement
new types of intellectual property protection, which would be substantially different from traditional intellectual property law. Congress did
implement sui generis protection for microchip architecture,127 but much
more innovative proposals have been made to tailor intellectual property
128
protection for changes in technology and culture. Eldred’s Copyright
Clause analysis, unlike its First Amendment analysis, did not limit its deference to “traditional” forms of protection.129 Accordingly, Eldred would
apparently authorize Congress to pursue such non-traditional forms of
protection (subject of course to other constitutional limits, such as the First
Amendment).130 The second area in which Eldred may affect federalism is
in preemption analysis. Federalism implicates the choice between federal
and state regulation in intellectual property, as in numerous other
spheres.131 As Part V below discusses in more detail, Eldred may lead to
greater federal control (and a less restrictive regime than some state
laws) in the area of intellectual property.

III. First Amendment Scrutiny of Copyright after ELDRED
A. What are the “Traditional Contours of Copyright Law”?
Eldred refused to apply First Amendment scrutiny to the copyright
extension.132 The Court’s language was broad enough that copyright,
both in general and as applied to particular cases, is likely not to be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. After Eldred, parties will generally be
127.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2000).
128.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308 (1994); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R.
Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution
for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 Iowa L. Rev. (2000); Mark Aaron Paley, A Model Software
Petite Patent Act, 12 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 301 (1996).
129.
See supra Part I.
130.
See discussion at supra Part I and infra Part III.
131.
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 685 (2002) (discussing federalism analysis in areas “from corporate law, international
antitrust law, local and international taxation, tort law, securities regulation, and environmental
law”).
132.
See supra Part I.
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unable to contend that the First Amendment shields them from liability
for copyright infringement. Rather, they must rely on the internal protections of copyright law such as fair use, the idea/expression dichotomy,
and first sale.133 Nevertheless, Eldred was still careful to leave the door
slightly open. It expressly rejected the lower court’s flat statement that
copyright is “categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.”134 Rather, the Court stated that First Amendment scrutiny
would be unnecessary where “Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection.”135 Presumably, legislation that goes
beyond the traditional contours of copyright would be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. This does not mean that non-traditional copyright
protection will be invalid; it just means that it will be subject to a higher
level of scrutiny than traditional protection. A key question after Eldred
is defining the “traditional contours of copyright protection.”136 The
problem of “tradition” thus raises its head once again, with all the vari137
ous problems of defining and comparing tradition.
Eldred itself indicates that the “traditional contours” of copyright
will not be measured strictly by the form of copyright around the time of
the Constitution. The first copyright statute of 1790 provided 14 years of
protection for published maps, charts, and books.138 Until 1976, copyright applied only to published works (subject to some narrow
139
exceptions). The present copyright statute is much broader in all respects. Far beyond maps, charts and books, copyright now applies to any
tangible form of creative work.140 The term has gone from 14 years to the
141
life of the author plus 70 years. Protection no longer depends on publication, so innumerable unpublished works (such as letters, doodles,
emails, artworks and so on) are copyrighted.142 The exclusive rights are
also broader, including rights such as the right to prepare derivative
133.
On the difficulties of relying on the idea/expression dichotomy, see Alfred C. Yen, A
First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s
Total Concept and Feel, 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989).
134.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
135.
Id. For an analysis of the likely constitutional issues in intellectual property law
after Eldred, see Samuelson, supra note 1.
136.
An interesting question would arise if Congress gave copyright-like protection
under a newly named form of intellectual property, as some have proposed. See Pamela
Samuelson et al., supra note 128.
137.
See discussion in supra Part I.
138.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 229–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139.
See id. at 193.
140.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”)
141.
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle
Rich, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 907 (1997).
142.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (protection now depends only on fixation, not publication).
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143

works. Eldred nevertheless deemed present-day copyright to share the
same contours as its 1790 predecessor.144 Moreover, in looking to the
traditional form of copyright, the Court included copyright’s built-in
First Amendment protections, such as fair use and the idea/expression
dichotomy.145 Those “traditional” protections were to be found nowhere
in the copyright statute until the 1976 Act, but were rather incorporated
146
by judicial opinions long after the first copyright statute. Given
Eldred’s broad approach to tradition, a clear definition of the traditional
contours of copyright is likely to be hard to find.
Rather, the question will arise with particular legislative enactments,
such as the anti-circumvention provisions added by the 1998 Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.147 The anti-circumvention provisions provide
a measure of legal protection, where a copyright holder has used technical means to prevent access to a work (such as scrambling a cable
television signal) or to prevent copying of a work (such as the anticopying code on some CDs).148 The anti-circumvention provisions make
it illegal to circumvent anti-access technology, or to traffic in devices or
services to circumvent either anti-access or anti-copying technology.149 It
would violate the anti-circumvention provisions to unscramble the
scrambled cable signal to a home (for circumventing an anti-access
measure) or to sell unauthorized cable boxes (for trafficking in circum150
vention devices).
A strong argument can be made that the anti-circumvention provisions go well beyond the “traditional contours” of copyright protection,

143.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
144.
See supra Part I.
145.
See supra Part I.
146.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (codification of fair use introduced by 1976 Act).
147.
See Balkin, supra note 19 (early comment after Eldred arguing that DMCA is
clearly an untraditional form of copyright protection, ripe for First Amendment scrutiny). For
a description of the DMCA and its enactment, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for
the “Digital Millennium”, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 137 (1999). For trenchant criticism
of the provisions, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813 (2001); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 519 (1999); Alfred Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA’s Anti-Trafficking Provisions (Mar. 21,
2003), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=388081 (adding suggestions for reforming the DMCA).
See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L.
& Arts 1, 14–20 (2000); David Nimmer, Back From The Future: A Proleptic Review of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 855 (2001).
148.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
149.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
150.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office Summary
(Dec. 1998).
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151

and are thus subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The copyright statute
had never provided explicit protection for anti-copying or anti-access
technology.152 This type of protection is also quite different from the traditional exclusive rights of the copyright holder: the rights to make and
distribute copies, to adapt the work, and to perform or display the work
publicly. The exclusive rights never implicated access to the work, as
such. Someone in possession of a copyrighted book could freely read the
book.153 The anti-circumvention provisions make it illegal to access a
copy of an encrypted work, even if one owns the copy.
In addition, the anti-circumvention provisions do not contain copyright’s traditional built-in First Amendment safeguards. The anticircumvention provisions do not have a general exception for fair use.154
Nor do they respect the idea/expression dichotomy, as unauthorized access or trafficking would violate the literal language of the provision,
even if the purpose is to gain access only to the ideas or other unprotected material in the work.155 Thus, anti-circumvention measures could
effectively protect even public domain material.156 In addition, the anticircumvention provisions may have the effect of reducing the fair use
rights in a work. Someone might have a copy of a work, and wish to
make a copy that would be protected by fair use. If the copy is protected
by anti-copying technology (such as encryption), it would violate the
anti-trafficking provisions for someone else to provide the necessary device or services to circumvent the anti-copying technology, even if fair
use authorized the making of the copy.157 For example, suppose Reader
had a copy of a copyrighted novel in electronic form. The electronic
book contains code that prevents Reader from making additional copies.
Reader wishes to make a copy of a short passage for nonprofit teaching
purposes, presumably a fair use. If Decoder posted an encryption pro151.
See Balkin, supra note 19 (characterizing DMCA as a “new species of intellectual
property protection”).
152.
See sources cited supra note 147.
153.
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
154.
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 41, 47–54 (2001); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000); Pete Singer, Mounting A
Fair Use Defense To The Anti-Circumvention Provisions Of The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 111 (2002); see also Julie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981
(1996).
155.
See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575 (2002).
156.
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1999)
(arguing that such enforcement would nevertheless provide efficient incentives for distribution
of information).
157.
See sources cited supra note 147.
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gram that Reader could use to make the fair use copy, Decoder would
violate the anti-circumvention provisions by trafficking in a device to
circumvent anti-copying technology.158
The provisions are drafted very broadly indeed, as the case law
shows. Researchers that publish reports about flaws in anticircumvention technologies may violate the DMCA, by “trafficking” in
anti-circumvention services (i.e. providing information on how to circumvent such technologies).159 Merely linking on a webpage to sites
where anti-circumvention programs are given away was held to give rise
160
to liability. Manufacturers have used the provisions as a litigation tool,
to prevent the sale of devices that are made to be compatible—even such
devices as garage door openers and toner cartridges for printers.161 In
short, the anti-circumvention provisions are an entirely new type of protection for copyright holders, with none of the traditional safeguards for
freedom of ideas.162 Such new rights would seem a prime candidate for
First Amendment scrutiny. If the rights are different from traditional
copyright, and the traditional safeguards are lacking, then the presumptions of tradition do not shield them from scrutiny.
Arguments can be made, however, that the anti-circumvention provisions do fit within the traditional contours of copyright law. They may be
different from previous statutes, the argument would run, but serve the
same purposes. Copyright law has long recognized secondary liability.
Contributory infringement applies where “one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces . . . or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another.”163 Vicarious liability applies where “the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in
the exploitation of the copyrighted materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired.”164 The
158.
See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 155.
159.
See Freedom to Tinker, at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com (a website collecting
materials and opinions regarding the DMCA).
160.
See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
161.
See Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Intellectual Property—Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Archive, at www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/ (files on Lexmark v. Static
Control Components and Chamberlain v. Skylink); see also Law Professors File Amicus Brief
in DMCA Suit Over Printer Cartridges, 65 BNA Patent, Trademark and Copyright Report 299 (Jan. 31 2003) (discussing amicus brief filed by law professors in Lexmark case,
arguing the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions should not apply).
162.
Indeed, one could even characterize them as granting patent-like protection to copyright subject matter. See Eugene Quinn, An Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress
Overstep its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention Prevention Provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 Brandeis L.J. 33 (2002).
163.
Gershwin Publ’g v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
164.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2nd Cir. 1963).
The best known secondary liability case is perhaps A & M Records. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001). See also Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for
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anti-circumvention provisions have been characterized as necessary to
adapt secondary liability to an age of digital works and computer networks.165 Because it is so easy to make and distribute copies of digital
works, it is thought that copyright owners need to rely on anti-access and
anti-copying technology. If circumvention devices and services were not
illegal, then such reliance would be impossible. The anti-circumvention
provisions could arguably be characterized as adapting vicarious liability
for the digital age, thus remaining within the traditional contours of
copyright law.166
Other considerations in Eldred might also bring anti-circumvention
provisions into the purview of the “traditional contours of copyright”.
Eldred gave considerable weight to the argument that the copyright extension was necessary to bring the U.S. copyright term into harmony
with the copyright term in other jurisdictions.167 Likewise, the anticircumventions provisions have been justified as fulfilling the copyright
168
treaty of obligations of the U.S. In addition, the anti-circumvention
provisions have been seen as securing the author’s rights of integrity and
attribution.169 An author can use anti-circumvention technology to ensure
that her work is not distorted and that she receives proper attribution for
her creation. Similar protections already exist in the copyright statute,
under the rights to adapt the work and the moral rights in works of visual
170
art.
In short, the argument would be that the anti-circumvention provisions fall within the traditional contours of copyright law in the same
way that the copyright extension did. The anti-circumvention provisions
do increase the rights of a copyright holder, but that was true of the term
extension. Eldred held that extending the copyright term from 14 years
to the life of the author plus 70 years does not change the contours of
Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 Hastings L.J. 939 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and
the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L.J. 1833 (2000).
165.
David L. Clark, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Can It Take Down Internet
Infringers?, 6 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 193, 195 (2002) (“In theory, the DMCA changes
neither the traditional protections granted by a copyright nor the traditional defenses to claims
of infringement—it is instead aimed at technological methods for enforcing copyrights in the
digital age.”).
166.
See sources cited supra note 147.
167.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003).
168.
See Samuelson, supra note 147 (“Although the WIPO Copyright Treaty requires
countries to provide ‘adequate protection’ against the circumvention of technical measures
used by copyright owners to protect their works from infringement, the DMCA went far
beyond treaty requirements in broadly outlawing acts of circumvention of access controls and
technologies that have circumvention-enabling uses.”).
169.
See Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, supra note 147.
170.
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
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171

copyright protection. One could argue that the anti-circumvention provisions are similar, because they build upon existing protections.
B. Choosing a Level of Scrutiny
If a court decided that legislation (such as the anti-circumvention
provisions) did fall outside the traditional contours of copyright protection, the legislation would be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The
next question would be, which of the many variations of First Amendment analysis would apply.172 Eldred held that the sort of intermediate
scrutiny applied in Turner was not appropriate, because copyright in173
fringement concerns using the speech of others. As discussed above,
that distinction lacks much grounding in First Amendment law.174 In addition, provisions like the anti-trafficking provisions do regulate the
defendants’ own speech. The anti-trafficking provisions prohibit not the
use of other’s copyrighted speech, but the trafficking of one’s own circumvention software.
Perhaps the best guidance on this issue comes from two earlier Supreme Court cases analyzing conflicts between non-traditional forms of
intellectual property protection and First Amendment rights, Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,175 and San Francisco Arts & Athletics
v. United States Olympic Committee.176 Zacchini held that imposition of
liability for infringing a performer’s right of publicity did not violate the
177
First Amendment. The defendant television station had secretly taped
the entire act of a “human cannonball” and broadcast it without permission.178 There was a strong state interest in providing intellectual property
protection, in providing an incentive for the production of such entertain179
ment. The Court noted the similarity to the incentive role of copyright
and patent law.180 That interest was particularly strong in Zacchini, where
the entire act had been recorded and broadcast. Moreover, granting exclusive rights still permitted public access to the information (through the
human cannonball’s own performances) and permitted others to engage in
171.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
172.
See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449–51 (2d Cir. 2001).
173.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220.
174.
See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
175.
433 U.S. 562 (1977); see Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First
Amendment Defenses in Right Of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 836 (1983)
(discussing interplay between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, particularly the
role of the fair use doctrine).
176.
483 U.S. 522 (1987).
177.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
178.
Id. at 563.
179.
Id. at 573.
180.
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991354

MCJOHNTYPE.DOC

124

1/27/2004 11:36 AM

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 10:95

similar performances, rather than simply free riding with a camera. The
means of protection were deemed sufficiently tailored to an important
state interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny.181 But note how demanding the scrutiny was. Had such scrutiny applied in Eldred, the weak
justifications for the extension of copyright on works from the 1920s
probably would not have passed such scrutiny. So Zacchini shows that,
182
where First Amendment scrutiny applies, it may be quite demanding.
San Francisco Arts & Athletics also upheld a non-traditional form of
intellectual property protection. A special provision of the federal trademark statute gave the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) the
right to prevent others from making various commercial and promotional
uses of the word “Olympic.”183 The provision gave the USOC much
greater rights than it could have under traditional trademark law. First, it
was given protection in the word “Olympic,” even though such a generic
term would usually not be protectable as a trademark. Secondly, it could
prevent uses by others, even if there was no showing that the use was
likely to cause confusion among consumers. This departure from the
“likelihood of confusion” standard abandoned the basic purpose of
trademark law, to prevent consumer confusion and deception. Nevertheless, the Court held that the regulation passed intermediate scrutiny,
meaning that the restrictions on speech were no greater than necessary to
further a substantial governmental interest.184 The USOC’s own activities
had created much of the value attached to the word “Olympic.” Granting
exclusive rights provided an incentive for the USOC to continue such
activities, with their broader benefits for international goodwill. Although the protection was broader than normal trademark protection,
they were deemed no broader than necessary to ensure that the USOC
reaped the benefits of its promotion of the Olympic movement.185
San Francisco Arts & Athletics shows that expansion of a form of intellectual property beyond its traditional contours (and dropping
traditional safeguards for freedom of expression) remains permissible
under the First Amendment. In general terms, the implications for the
scrutiny of copyright’s anti-circumvention provisions would be as follows. If the provisions are deemed to go beyond the traditional contours
of copyright protection, they would be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Such scrutiny would be much more exacting than the deferential
approach Eldred accorded to traditional protections. The provisions
181.
See id. at 578.
182.
But cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
2001) (Pre-Eldred decision analyzing right of publicity as commercial speech).
183.
See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 526.
184.
See id. at 537–40.
185.
Id. at 540.
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would be subject to attack in particular on the grounds that they go well
beyond the extent necessary to protect the rights of copyright holders.
However, the mere fact that they lack the traditional safeguards (fair use
and the idea/expression dichotomy) would not be dispositive. Rather, a
more extensive examination of how the particular form of protection
served the relevant interests would be required.
C. First Amendment Scrutiny for Other Forms of
Intellectual Property Protection After Eldred
A brief review of other areas of intellectual property beyond copyright suggests that Eldred will not shield them from First Amendment
scrutiny. Eldred’s rationale for not applying First Amendment scrutiny to
copyright legislation rested on two types of tradition: copyright dates
from the time of the First Amendment and copyright has built-in First
Amendment safeguards. First Amendment protection has been raised in
trademark,186 trade secret,187 and even patent law.188 Each raises slightly
different issues with respect to “tradition.”
Federal trademark protection does not date back to the time of the
First Amendment, so federal trademark protection does not have the
hallmark of tradition. State law, however, has protected trademark from
earlier times. So the question might become whether the specific type of
trademark protection goes beyond trademark’s traditional contours.
Trademark has steadily increased its areas of coverage.189 Likely candidates for non-traditional status would be false advertising, anti-dilution
protection, and the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.190
Even the basic theory of trademark infringement itself could be seen as
unmoored from its traditional basis. Trademarks were once a specific
type of designation of source. Now trademark infringement includes
such theories as false endorsement, reverse confusion, and initial interest

186.
See, e.g., Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1079 (1986) (discussing a common problem, the conflict
between rights of trademark owners and the free speech rights of other to refer to those
marks).
187.
Adam W. Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The Battle Between Free
Speech and Trade Secrets, 54 Fed. Comm. L.J. 517 (2002).
188.
See Burk, supra note 14, at 150.
189.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn’t Exist, Where It Doesn’t Exist: Rethinking Two Doctrines from the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 487
(1995) (discussing common law trademark); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the
Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Kenneth Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 827 (2000).
190.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
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confusion. Moreover, the symbols protected as marks were once only
words, names, or specific types of emblems and artistic figures used to
designate products.192 After the Supreme Court decision in Qualitex Co.
193
v. Jacobson Products Co, Inc., almost anything can potentially qualify
as a mark, even mere colors, sounds, or fragrances, not to mention the
broad and ill-defined category of trade-dress. So present day trademark
law could be deemed to have expanded beyond its traditional contours.
However, trademark law does contain features that could be considered built-in First Amendment safeguards. Ownership of a trademark
does not confer exclusive rights to use the symbol; rather, it only gives
the right to prevent others from using it in a way that may confuse consumers (or dilute the mark). Trademark law also recognizes fair use
(albeit a much narrower version than copyright law).194 Courts have also
recognized defenses such as parody and nominative use, that also leave
breathing space for expressive use of others’ marks.195 Finally, the recent
196
Supreme Court decision Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. cut back
considerably on the reach of the anti-dilution provision, which was perhaps the most likely trademark provision to threaten freedom of
expression. So affirming First Amendment scrutiny of trademark law
may not drastically change its landscape.
Trade secret law has only recently become embroiled in First
Amendment scrutiny.197 Trade secret cases most often involve little expressive interest, involving allegations of misappropriation of such
matter as customer lists, manufacturing formulas, or blueprints for machines. Trade secret protection as such is a relatively recent
development. The earlier cases relied on various conflicting and vague
rationales, before the law gained some uniformity with the Restatement
of Torts in 1939.198 However, trade secret as a form of idea protection
could fit within “traditional” forms of property protection.199 Trade secret
191.
See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000)
(initial interest confusion); Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127 (9th
Cir. 1998) (reverse confusion).
192.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999).
193.
514 U.S. 159 (1995).
194.
See, e.g., Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir.
1995).
195.
See, e.g., The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302
(9th Cir. 1992).
196.
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
197.
See, e.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th 648 (6th Dist.
2001); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001); Ford Motor Co. v.
Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
198.
Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939).
199.
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of
Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 603 (1994). On application of the
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protection could be seen as simply enforcing traditional rules against
breach of confidential relationships. Indeed, the Eldred approach to tradition could cut the other way with respect to trade secrets. Courts have
generally held that enforcement of contracts does not implicate the First
Amendment because enforcement of private agreements is not state action. Under Eldred, this could qualify as a long-standing tradition, which
would foreclose First Amendment scrutiny.200 So to the extent that trade
secret law serves to enforce duties of confidentiality, Eldred might indicate that it would be relatively free from First Amendment scrutiny.
However, a strong counterargument would be that the sort of cases in
which First Amendment issues arise (such as a whistleblower informing
a newspaper of product defects) are outside the traditional scope of contract law.
Turning to patent law, the argument that a finding of patent infringement would violate the First Amendment has been rare. A patent
grants rights to exclude others from making, using, and selling an invention,201 so expressive activity is rarely at issue in a patent infringement
case. However, the subject matter of patent law has steadily increased, to
202
where patent protection can now cover expressive activity. Patent law
has become so broad that it could cover the methods of “disciplines
ranging from the social sciences to the law.”203 The writing and dissemination of computer software, for example, could be expressive activity
204
but also covered by the patent laws.
Would First Amendment scrutiny apply to patent protection? Patent
protection is traditional, in the same sense as the Eldred Court applied it
to copyright. The same clause of the Constitution grants Congress the
power to grant copyrights and patents. The first patent statute is roughly
contemporaneous with the first copyright statute. Nevertheless, some distinctions could be made with respect to patent protection. First, the subject
matter of patent has gone far beyond its traditional boundaries. Copyright
subject matter has also spread, but from the beginning, copyright has applied to expressive subject matter, such as books. The application of patent
to expressive subject matter is much more recent. For that very reason,

First Amendment to mere possession of information, see Rodney A. Smolla, Information as
Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev.
1099 (2002).
200.
See supra Part I.
201.
See 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (2000).
202.
See Burk, supra note 14, at 145–50.
203.
See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev.
1139, 1142 (1999).
204.
Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 233 (1998).
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patent law does not contain built-in First Amendment safeguards. Thus,
it would seem that patent would be subject to more rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny than copyright, to the extent that it regulates expressive activity.
In addition to existing intellectual property protection, a number of
proposals have been made in Congress to strengthen intellectual property
rights. Some could have drastic effects on free expression. For example,
proposed digital rights legislation could effectively “outlaw general purpose computers and most open source software by requiring that devices
and software capable of playing digital content have standard DRM
technologies built into them.”206 Such legislation imposes considerable
restraint on expression and the distribution of expressive works. Thus, it
is likely to lead to further First Amendment challenges. Moreover, if it
departs from the traditional contours of copyright protection, it will be
subject to stricter First Amendment review.

IV. The Constitutionalization of Fair Use
Eldred placed great reliance on fair use as a built-in First Amendment safeguard in copyright law. Because copyright contained such
safeguards as fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy, additional First
Amendment scrutiny was unnecessary. Eldred thus rested the constitutional status of copyright on fair use.
Before Eldred, the Supreme Court had addressed the interplay between fair use and the First Amendment, but never in such broad terms.
207
Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, for example, refused
to broaden the scope of fair use for a particular type of case. In Harper
& Row, The Nation magazine obtained a pre-publication copy of President Gerald Ford’s autobiography and published brief excerpts without
permission.208 The Court rejected the argument that the First Amendment
required that fair use protect such copying of historically important material:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in
the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expres205.
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1177 (2000); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for
Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623 (2001).
206.
The Berkeley Center for Law and Technology DRM Conference: Schedule of
Events, at www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/drm/schedule.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2003).
207.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
208.
Id. at 543.
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sion and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we
see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create
what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.209
Harper & Row addressed only the interplay between fair use and the
First Amendment in a single case.210 Eldred, by contrast, relied on fair
use to uphold the copyright extension of many copyrighted works.
Eldred thus rests the very constitutionality of copyright law on fair use.
The fair use doctrine has always been notoriously difficult to define.211 For much of its history, fair use was simply a judge-made
doctrine that courts used to find no infringement in particular cases.212
Courts did not strictly define the scope of fair use, or even whether it was
a defense or a limitation on the scope of the exclusive rights. The 1976
Act finally expressly adopted fair use. Section 107 now flatly declares
that fair use is not infringement,213 but the statute does little to define the
214
scope of fair use. Rather, it simply instructs the court to look to several
factors in deciding if a use is fair or not: the nature of the use; the nature
of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the use; and
the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.215
The continuing viability of fair use has come into question. Some
have argued that the scope of fair use should narrow with improvements
in technology and licensing. Fair use is sometimes defined as simply a
response to market failure, permitting uses where negotiating for permission would be prohibitively expensive.216 Thus, an out-of-print book is
209.
Id. at 560.
210.
See Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the
Integrity of Copyright, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 13–16 (1999) (calling for a critical reexamination
of the approach in Harper & Row).
211.
See William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law (2d ed.
1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661
(1988).
212.
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990).
213.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
214.
See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43
U. Miami L. Rev. 233 (1988).
215.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
216.
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1982) (seminal
article, often narrowly misread); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989). There are a number of other theoretical justifications for fair use. See, e.g., Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A
Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 Yale L.J. 1179 (2003); Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law
of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533 (1993). Non-economic theories can also lead to a
narrow view of fair use. See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 Duke
L.J. 1532.
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217

subject to broader fair use than one available on the market. Under the
broadest interpretation of that approach, fair use would dwindle away as
it became less necessary, in light of digital rights management systems
and the like.218 Fair use thus could become a “step-child of copyright
law.”219 Commentators have indeed noted a trend toward a narrowing of
fair use.220 A recent Second Circuit opinion questioned whether fair use
had any constitutional basis: “Preliminarily, we note that the Supreme
Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required, although
some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably be enlisted for
such a requirement.”221
After Eldred, however, fair use attains constitutional status. Under
the Eldred analysis, the availability of fair use is central to the constitutional basis of copyright protection. Thus, fair use after Eldred assumes a
position analogous to the doctrine of originality after the Supreme
Court’s 1992 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service.222 The fair use doctrine can now also be more explicitly used to

217.
Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 149 (1998) (discussing market failure analysis); Robert P.
Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in
Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
218.
See Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure (1995); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox (1994); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact
of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557
(1998); I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F.
217; Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection
of Digital Works, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 845 (1997).
219.
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (1997) (criticizing market failure
approach).
220.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg’s Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious
Pluralism, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 329 (2003) (noting a “shrinking doctrine of fair use”); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives—Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483,
546 (1996) (“As Congress and various courts have expanded the scope of the author’s protected interest, so too have they narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine.”); Stephen M.
McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 77 (1998); Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital
World, 79 Or. L. Rev. 647, 675 (2000) (“Unfortunately, however, fair use applications are
shrinking along with other traditional limitations”); see also Kenneth Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1999).
221.
Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001).
222.
Another possible outcome of Eldred could be increasing use of tradition in construing the Copyright Act itself. Considerable scholarship already is in place for such an endeavor.
See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM “Copies”: Hit or a Myth? Historical Perspectives
on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 423
(1997).
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223

protect First Amendment values. Thus, courts would be better able to
go beyond the specific factors listed in the statute. Fair use is a flexible
doctrine well suited to addressing the many factors that affect issues of
free expression.224
A case that illustrates how fair use could be used to explicitly protect
First Amendment values is Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International.225 In Veeck, a non-profit entity had authored a model building code.226 It also sold copies of the code.227 Two towns in Texas adopted
the model code as their municipal building codes.228 A local resident, after unsuccessfully seeking copies from the town offices, bought a copy
from the non-profit and posted it on a website.229 Such activity could be
copyright infringement, for making copies and for distributing copies to
the public. The case thus raised the issue of copyright protection for privately authored codes that are adopted into law. The court held that once
the codes had been adopted into law, they become uncopyrighted under
the “merger doctrine.”230 As first authored, codes represented original,
creative expression which would normally be copyrightable.231 However,
the court reasoned, once adopted as law, the codes become “ideas” or
“facts,” which are not protectable under the idea/expression dichotomy.232 To the extent the codes contained expression, they were
inseparable from the unprotectable ideas and facts, and therefore unprotected under the merger doctrine.
The result in Veeck (that some unauthorized use of copyrighted
works may be required to permit nonprofit dissemination of local law)
may be sound, but fair use could now provide a more satisfactory basis
for the result. Before Eldred, fair use may not have seemed appropriate.
If copies of the code could be easily purchased, then the market-oriented
approach to fair use would not excuse making unauthorized copies. After
223.
On how to address First Amendment values using fair use, see Jonathan Dowell,
Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 Cal. L.
Rev. 843 (1998); Michael Madison, Complexity And Copyright In Contradiction, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 125 (2000). Other doctrines of copyright, such as first sale, could also
play such a role. See Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 1 (2002).
224.
Indeed, fair use could even be used to address the specific issue of copyright term—
the subject of Eldred—by increasing the availability of fair use for later in the copyright term.
See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 409 (2002).
225.
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
226.
Id. at 793.
227.
Id. at 794.
228.
Id. at 793.
229.
Id.
230.
Id. at 802.
231.
See id. at 794.
232.
Id. at 801.
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Eldred, however, the First Amendment interest in freely distributing local law to those interested in it would take precedence. Moreover,
application of the merger doctrine is a blunt instrument because it entails
holding that the model code loses all copyright protection once adopted.
Thus, merger would permit not just nonprofit uses in areas where the
code had been adopted, but also free copying and use, even if for strictly
commercial purposes in jurisdictions where the code was not the law.
Fair use would permit a more nuanced approach.
A greater objection to application of the merger doctrine follows
from the nature of the case law system. Copyrighted works can become
part of the law in contexts well beyond adoption of model codes. For
example, various leading copyright cases involve analysis of such works
as the novel Gone With the Wind,233 the song “Pretty Woman,”234 and
President Gerald Ford’s autobiography.235 In a real sense, such works
have become part of copyright law. In order to determine whether fair
use applies in a case, parties must determine whether the facts of those
cases (including the copyrighted works) apply by analogy to the case at
issue. Applying Veeck logically would lead to the absurd result that a
copyrighted works lose copyright status is they become part of the facts
of precedential cases. By contrast, the fair use doctrine after Eldred can
be used to authorize free expression without the doctrinal problems of
the merger doctrine.
Fair use can also be used to address First Amendment concerns with
respect to non-traditional forms of copyright protection. As discussed
above, the anti-circumvention provisions do not contain an exception for
fair use. A number of commentators have argued that an implied fair use
exception should nevertheless be read into the statute.236 After Eldred, it
is clear that the anti-circumvention provisions are ripe for First Amendment scrutiny, in large part because they lack the traditional built-in First
Amendment protection of fair use. A court could avoid the First
Amendment analysis with the common approach of construing the statute to contain First Amendment safeguards—by reading in an implied
exception for fair use.
A twist on fair use as speech protection is presented in the area of
reverse engineering.237 Courts and commentators have strongly supported

233.
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
234.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
235.
See Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
236.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (commenting on the DMCA).
237.
See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1995) (discussing the importance of fair use in facilitating reverse engineering).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991354

MCJOHNTYPE.DOC

Fall 2003]

1/27/2004 11:36 AM

Eldred’s Aftermath

133
238

the application of fair use for reverse engineering. Whether seeking to
study the functional aspects of a work is protected activity under the
First Amendment is an interesting question.239 Regardless of whether reverse engineering is deemed to be protected speech or not, the rationale
of Eldred would support using fair use to protect reverse engineering.
Eldred emphasized that copyright’s built-in safeguards (fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy) permit the free use of ideas from copyrighted works.240 Functional aspects of works are not protected by
copyright, and thus fair use would help preserve this traditional distinction.

V. ELDRED’S Effects on Preemption and
Intellectual Property
Some of the greatest restrictions on an individual’s rights to use and
disseminate information may, ironically, be those she has agreed to. It is
customary to provide information subject to licenses. When software is
sold, or web-sites accessed, or information downloaded (be it software,
music, data), there is likely to be a license to which the recipient purportedly agrees. Such agreement is often more a legal fiction than reality,
but courts have shown a tendency to enforce such shrink-wrap or clickthrough licenses. Among other things, the license terms often provide
that the recipient waives certain rights under copyright law, such as fair
use or first sale rights.241 Moreover, the recipient will likely agree to restrictions on information that would not be protected by copyright, such

238.
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091 (1995);
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and
Professor Miller, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 975 (1994); Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998); David A. Rice,
Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least as Far as It Goes, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1131 (1994).
239.
A related issue is the extent to which software is protected speech. See Robert C.
Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 713 (2000);
Amy E. McCall, The DMCA and Researchers’ First Amendment Rights, 3 Pgh. J. Tech. L. &
Policy 2 (Spring 2002), at http://www.pitt.edu/~sorc/techjournal/articles/Vol3McCall.pdf.
240.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003).
241.
See David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 Cal. L.
Rev. 17, 30 (1999); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Provisions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 543, 554 (1992); see also Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of
Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 569 (1997) (noting some conflict between enforcement of contract and copyright norms).
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as ideas, data, or functional aspects of works. So state contract law may
be used to give protections that federal copyright law does not.242
The question then arises whether the federal copyright statute pre243
empts state contract law. To the extent that copyright law preempts
such restrictive clauses, the federal statute serves to preserve the free
flow of information, acting as a sort of consumer protection statute.244
Recent decisions, however, have tended not to find that federal copyright
law preempts contract law.245 Eldred could help change that trend.
To the extent that federal law preempts regulation in an area, state
law is invalid. Courts apply three types of preemption:
Explicit preemption. A federal statute may expressly preempt
state law in the relevant field, completely or partly.
Field preemption: If federal law occupies the entire field, then
there is no room for application of state law.
Conflict preemption: State law is preempted if it would be
impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or
state law stands in the way of accomplishment of the objec246
tives of the federal law.
The Copyright Act contains an express preemption provision, which
preempts any state law rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
247
rights of a federal copyright. Several leading decisions have held that
248
this provision does not preempt state contract law. The provision applies to rights that are equivalent to the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder.249 Rights under a contract, however, are not exclusive rights in
this sense. Rather, they govern only the parties to the contract. The few
242.
See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age,
67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025 (1998).
243.
See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
“Rights Management”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998).
244.
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 111, 114–15 (1999) (citing Whit Diffie and Glynn Lunney).
245.
See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding
that shrinkwrap licenses that override the fair use defense were not preempted by federal
copyright law); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that license
that prohibited copying of noncopyrightable information was not preempted). On preemption
of contract by copyright, see Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2001) (arguing
that contract provides a better alternative to copyright protection); Maureen A. O’Rourke,
Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software
License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479 (1995).
246.
See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
247.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
248.
See Baystate, 320 F.3d at 1317; ProCD, 89 F.3d at 1447.
249.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991354

MCJOHNTYPE.DOC

Fall 2003]

1/27/2004 11:36 AM

Eldred’s Aftermath

135

cases on point, then, have generally held that explicit statutory preemption does not apply to contracts.250
However, courts have been puzzlingly reluctant to analyze the other
251
type of preemption which might apply, conflict preemption. Even if
such contractual provisions are not explicitly preempted, they could conflict with federal copyright law.252 Contracts often contain restrictions
253
that would be permitted by copyright law. Software licenses might
contain clauses prohibiting reverse engineering, which would otherwise
be fair use.254 Database licenses may prohibit copying or distribution of
facts, which are not protected by law. Non-disclosure agreements likewise prohibit restrictions on non-copyrightable material, such as
functional matter, facts or ideas. In patent law, a line of cases has held
conflict preemption applicable to state law that interfered with the underlying goals of federal patent law.255 The Supreme Court invalidated state
statutes that simply prohibited copying and selling an unpatented prod256
uct. However, in the copyright area, courts have been more reluctant to
find conflict preemption. One possible reason for the difference is that
the copyright statute, unlike the patent statute, has an explicit preemption
provision. Courts implicitly approach copyright preemption as if only
explicit preemption were at issue.257
Eldred could strengthen the argument that conflict preemption survives in copyright. Under Eldred, such copyright doctrines as fair use
and the idea/expression dichotomy are not simply details of copyright
law. Rather, they are necessary for copyright law as such to be constitutionally permissible. In that case, they must represent bed-rock policy of
250.
But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying
preemption to enforcement of software license terms, where license effectively denied rights
provided by Section 117 of the Copyright Act).
251.
Courts generally fail even to discuss the conflict preemption analysis. See, e.g.,
Baystate, 320 F.3d at 1317. In Baystate, despite an amicus brief spelling out the relevant Supremacy Clause analysis, conflict preemption was not discussed by the majority or even the
dissenting judge, who would have held preemption available. See also Robert Merges et
al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 846–48 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing distinctions between different modes of preemption in copyright).
252.
See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1089, 1130 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and OnLine Licenses, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 511 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, (1995).
253.
See Rice, supra note 241.
254.
See Brandon L. Grusd, Note, Contracting Beyond Copyright: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 353 (1997).
255.
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A MarketBased Approach, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (1997).
256.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S.
225 (1964).
257.
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (pre-1976 preemption case).
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copyright law. State law that is inconsistent with such policy could accordingly face a strong preemption argument.258
This is far from saying that contract law would be preempted whenever it restricted copying or dissemination of information. A valid role of
contracts is to regulate flow of information.259 Only in extreme cases,
where contract practice threatens to completely undo federal copyright
policy would preemption apply. A prime example might be provisions in
mass-marketing licensing agreements, with clauses that purport to completely prohibit reverse-engineering.260 Enforcement of such a clause
would effectively allow software to be widely sold, without anyone able
to legally examine its functional, noncopyrightable features.
Thus, Eldred also plays a role in federalism, to the extent it affects
the balance between federal and state intellectual property protection.
This brand of federalism, in a sense, cuts against the grain of the Commerce Clause cases, because it would have the effect of decreasing the
scope of state law. It would, however, be entirely consistent with the underlying philosophy of the Commerce Clause cases, which is to maintain
the constitutionally mandated federal-state balance, because it would
apply preemption due to the exercise of a specific congressional power.
The Court has been vigilant in maintaining the right of state law, rather
than federal law, to govern areas of the common law.261 Copyright, in
contrast, is a federal statute promulgated under a specific grant of federal
law.
The traditionalist reasoning of Eldred would also have some applicability to govern another issue in the area of intellectual property and
the First Amendment, the enforceability of contracts that restrict the flow
of information. Eldred may put paid to another argument against enforcing contracts that restrict information. Some have argued that
enforcement of a contract that restricts information could violate the
First Amendment. After Eldred, succeeding with such an argument becomes more difficult. Contractual provisions restricting information have
long been enforced, and such tradition could weigh against a perceived
change in First Amendment law.
258.
See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 959, 972 (1991) (“Whereas the fulcrum of the economic balance struck
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copyright law is not the question of copyright ability but the question of fair use.”).
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Conclusion
The specific issue in Eldred was the constitutionality of the copyright term extension, but the case explored broader issues that the Court
has largely left unresolved: the extent of Congress’s power under the
Copyright Clause and the extent to which the First Amendment controls
the Copyright Clause. With respect to both issues, Eldred’s broad holdings gave little constitutional protection to the public domain. The Court
did not impose the sort of restrictions that it has recently introduced on
other congressional powers, such as the power to regulate commerce.
Rather, after Eldred, Congress may generally choose the intellectual
property regime, without judicial review of whether legislation truly
serves the purposes of the Clause. Likewise, the First Amendment will
generally not restrict intellectual property legislation. Rather, the internal
controls of copyright law, such as fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy must serve to protect expressive interests.
Eldred thus upheld broad powers of Congress to regulate intellectual
property, against both First Amendment and Copyright Clause challenges. However, the decision may provide tools that serve to protect
aspects of the public domain. Eldred insulated traditional copyright protection from First Amendment scrutiny, but opened the door for scrutiny
of the more dangerous innovations in copyright law. Eldred also put the
doctrine of fair use on a firm constitutional footing. It further provides a
basis for stronger arguments for applying preemption to contract provisions that restrict the flow of information and ideas. Eldred’s legacy,
thus, may be oddly asymmetrical. Its direct effect was to leave works
created in the early part of the twentieth century under copyright protection. At the same time, with respect to the cutting edge of copyright law,
such as digital rights management, technology law, and information licensing, Eldred may provide support for freedom of expression and
innovation.
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